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Organizations may view outsourcing as a way to manage risk. We developed a decision-analytic approach to
determine which risks the buyer can share or shift to vendors and which ones it should bear. We found that
allocating risks incorrectly could increase costs dramatically. Between 1995 and 1998, we used this approach to
develop the request for proposals (RFP) for the US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) privatization initiative for
the Hanford tank waste remediation system (TWRS). In the model, we used an assessment protocol to predict
how vendors would react to proposed risk allocations in terms of their actions and their pricing. We considered
the impact of allocating each major risk to potential vendors, to the DOE, or to both and identified the risk
allocation that would minimize the DOE’s total cost—its direct payments to vendors plus the costs of any
residual risks it accepted. Allocating inappropriate risks to the vendor would have increased costs because the
vendor would add a large risk premium to its bids, while allocating inappropriate risks to the DOE also would
have increased costs because the vendor would not take adequate risk-reduction measures. With the improved
risk allocation, the RFPs resulted in bids that were acceptable to the DOE.
Key words : decision analysis: risks; government: agencies.
History : This paper was refereed.
In the mid 1990s, the US Department of Energy(DOE) was planning the cleanup of its nuclear
waste tanks at the Hanford site in Washington State.
It faced well-documented problems, because of the
volume, the makeup, and the poor characterization
of the waste held in the underground storage tanks.
The DOE’s task was complicated by many legal
obligations and constraints, and by the political
sensitivity of the problem arising from a history of
delays, disagreements, and disclosures at the site. Var-
ious stakeholders were concerned about spending,
environmental issues, and radioactivity. The antici-
pated cost was in the tens of billions of dollars.
To minimize costs and risks, in 1994 the DOE
undertook what it called a privatization initiative
under which contractors (vendors) would have as
much decision-making authority and responsibility as
possible. The DOE, in partnership with the Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), established
a large privatization team near the Hanford site to
support this initiative. Its first major task was to con-
tract with one or more vendors for the development
and demonstration phase of the cleanup. The DOE
had to draft and issue a request for proposals (RFP),
evaluate and select bids, and negotiate contract terms.
Comments from potential vendors on a 1995 draft
RFP (TWRS Privatization 1995) showed that risk allo-
cation was a major concern: the privatization initia-
tive depended on the contractor’s being able to obtain
financing, and the financial market probably would
not accept certain risks. Other risks were potentially
acceptable but would require a high risk premium.
The potential vendors were under no obligation at
this point to tell the DOE how high the risk premium
really had to be, however, and the DOE wanted to
avoid being locked into bad contract terms.
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From late 1995 to early 1998, the PNNL contracted
with coauthors (Keisler, Buehring, and Whitfield) all
at that time from Argonne National Laboratory’s
(ANL) Decision and Information Sciences Division
to support the risk-management group (headed by
coauthors McLaughlin and Robershotte) of its priva-
tization team. Thus, the PNNL was the direct client
for this work, using it to write portions of the RFP
that the DOE ultimately issued (TWRS Privatization
1996). ANL proposed the basic structure for this work
and conducted most of the assessments and analy-
sis, while the PNNL advised on the approach, partic-
ipated in the assessments, managed interactions with
the privatization team, and integrated the results with
the rest of the privatization plan. We developed a
decision-analytic approach to help the DOE deter-
mine how it should allocate risks within the RFP, that
is, to what extent should the DOE accept risks and to
what extent should it pass risks on to the vendor?
We defined alternative allocations and assessed the
risks resulting from them to quantify their cost impli-
cations, while accounting for the different incentives
and risk-bearing capacity of the DOE and its poten-
tial vendors, leading to a successful RFP and further
efforts to institutionalize our approach.
The problem of how to allocate risks is prevalent in
all sorts of contracting situations, and using RFPs that
allocate risks poorly can cause inefficient outcomes.
Our conceptual approach applies in many of those
situations.
Conceptual Approach
Allocating a risk to the party better able to control
it motivates that party to find the best way to man-
age that risk. Each party has expectations about how
the other will behave given the incentives implied by
the risk allocation, and those expectations ought to
inform contractual negotiations. It is also reasonable
to think that the larger party (the government in this
case) would be better able to deal with large variances
in financial outcomes than would smaller parties
(vendors). This implies that, other things remaining
equal, the contractors would demand a larger pre-
mium to bear risks than would the government. To
allocate risks efficiently, the decision makers must
take note of all these factors and balance them.
Viewing this as a decision-analysis problem, with
the DOE as the decision maker, we wanted to choose
the risk allocation that would maximize the DOE’s
expected utility. It faced environmental uncertain-
ties and uncertainties about how vendors would
respond to the proposal. Inspired by game theory,
or at least the asymmetric prescriptive-descriptive
approach Raiffa (1982) outlined, we built a prescrip-
tive model for the DOE’s decisions and a descrip-
tive model for the vendor’s decisions. From the DOE’s
Price ExogenousRFP Mitigation
(DOE) (Vendor)
Amelioration
(DOE) (Vendor)
DOE
view
Vendor
view
Figure 1: Stylized decision trees were used to represent the cash flows
resulting from a contract. For the DOE, the first node is the DOE’s decision
about how to allocate risks in the RFP. The second node is the potential
vendor’s decision (an uncertainty from the DOE’s perspective) about what
price to bid (to be predicted using a vendor-response model). The third
node represents the DOE’s decisions taken to mitigate risks. The fourth
node consists of the vendor’s decisions taken to mitigate risks (inde-
pendent of the previous node). Following this are uncertain exogenous
events, after which the DOE acts to ameliorate the outcomes for the events
that have occurred, after which the vendor does the same (independent
of the previous node). The DOE’s end-point values are determined by the
contractual payments it makes to the vendor along with the costs incurred
due to the risks it bears and the events that occur. For the vendor, the first
node is an uncertainty about how the DOE decided to issue the RFP. The
second node is the vendor’s decision about what price to bid. The third
node is a decision node about its steps to mitigate risks. The fourth node
is an uncertainty about the DOE’s steps to mitigate risks (independent of
the vendor’s choices about the same), and the fifth node consists of uncer-
tain exogenous events. The fifth node consists of the vendor’s decisions
to ameliorate negative outcomes, and the sixth node is the DOE’s actions
(about which the vendor is uncertain) to ameliorate risks (again indepen-
dent of the previous node).
point of view, the problem could be viewed as a styl-
ized decision tree with nodes representing its deci-
sions and nodes representing uncertainties (Figure 1).
From the vendor’s point of view, the DOE has
already chosen its risk allocation. We simplified the
vendor’s decision tree and assumed that the vendor’s
goal is to maximize its chance of getting the contract,
that is, to bid as low a price as possible, subject to
the constraint that it still be possible to finance the
project. That is, it passes on the risks it faces to its
financiers and it is these financiers’ risk attitudes that
we modeled.
The financiers consist of equity and debt providers.
Equity providers consider the predicted variance
of cash flows and demand an expected return on
equity based on that risk. Debt providers look at the
likelihood that they will be repaid without problems
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and demand not only that an interest rate be based on
that measure of risk but also that the project have a
percentage of equity investment that depends on the
level of risk. The prediction of cash flows (that will
be used to make debt payments and the amount of
residual cash flow left to give a return on equity) is
based on the vendor’s anticipated fixed and variable
costs, the contracted price for waste treated, and the
possible consequences of risks as allocated in the RFP.
Assessment of Individual Risks
We started with a list of 100 risks. We combined
some of the risks and narrowed the list substantially.
The final list contained risks for which the potential
impact was sizable, the range of possible allocations
was substantial, and the right allocation was not obvi-
ous. We examined nine major risks, some requiring
separate assessment of subsidiary risks:
(1) Interest rate (interest rates may change between
the time of the bid and financing),
(2) Inflation (the vendor faces exposure to inflation
risk in the draft RFP),
(3) Change in law (applicable laws and regulations
may change),
(4) Permitting (the vendor may not be able to
obtain necessary permits),
(5) Waste envelope C (probably the most techni-
cally difficult waste to process),
(6) Appropriation (Congress may not appropriate
funds adequate for planned activities),
(7) Decontamination and decommissioning (D and
D may be more costly than expected),
(8) Other uncontrollable circumstances (lawsuit,
sabotage, earthquake, tornado), and
(9) Not-to-exceed (NTE) price risk (the contract
pricing arrangement could be a literal price limit, as
in the draft RFP, or could be a target price that allows
selected adjustments).
We also assessed a background risk level for the
DOE and the vendor, that is, the residual risk each
would bear even if all nine risks resolved to their base
cases.
We characterized each risk through discussions
with the PNNL privatization staff experts. We used a
common form to organize the assessments. For each
risk, we defined three alternative allocations: the risk
was to be borne primarily by the DOE, to be shared,
or to be borne primarily by the vendor. We con-
structed these allocations using both qualitative and
quantitative definitions to match reasonable alterna-
tive phrasings the DOE might include in the RFP. This
meant, for example, that even for risks allocated pri-
marily to the vendor, the DOE could still bear some
tangible risk. Similarly, shared risk does not neces-
sitate a completely symmetric risk-bearing arrange-
ment. The specific vendor was not yet known, so
we did our assessments for a representative poten-
tial vendor. We intended the definitions to be pre-
cise enough to translate without ambiguity to specific
wording within the RFP. When the DOE later used
the model to evaluate specific bids, we conducted dif-
ferent assessments for different vendors.
We then defined the possible outcomes. After
obtaining verbal descriptions of the mitigation steps
each party would likely take under each potential risk
allocation, we assessed probabilities of each outcome
(implicitly conditioned on the likely mitigating steps
taken by both parties). For this step, we tried to take
the vendor’s view as well as the DOE’s view. We
assumed that vendors would assign the same prob-
abilities to each outcome as would the DOE, unless
there were special reasons not to (for example, the
DOE might be far more trustworthy regarding a cer-
tain risk than the vendor believed, or the vendor
might be more concerned about different risks and
events than would the DOE). We also obtained verbal
descriptions of the steps each party would be likely
to take to ameliorate the negative outcomes of risks
under each allocation.
Finally, we obtained verbal descriptions of what the
consequences would be for each side for each out-
come of the risk, assuming both sides had taken the
predicted steps. From this information, we assessed
point estimates or probability distributions over the
financial consequences for each side. The conse-
quences were defined in terms of the net present
value (NPV) of cash flows computed at the current
risk-free rate, and expressed as increments from a
base case in which the project proceeds without diffi-
culty. In some cases, we noted that outcomes of one
risk would determine the relevance of other risks; for
example, if the project stopped early, later risks would
not affect cash flows.
The following summary of one such assessment,
namely the assessment for D and D risk, illustrates the
process of defining the alternate allocations and the
risk-management scenarios and the resulting param-
eters that we used in the model (Table 1). It took us
approximately one half day to assess this risk. Keisler
and Buehring (1996) give the details of all the risk
assessments.
Results of Interviews to Characterize One of the
Risks (D and D)
Risk Name: Decontamination and decommission-
ing (D and D).
Description: D and D may be more costly than
expected, particularly if the vendor is not provided
with an incentive, through allocation of risk to the
vendor, to keep these costs low.
Consequences: The consequence is given in terms
of the probability distribution over D and D costs,
assumed to occur 10 years after production starts.
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Risk allocation DOE takes risk Shared risk Vendor takes risk
Description DOE is responsible Vendor sets aside limited funds, Vendor is responsible for D and D; DOE pays
for D and D. which may be refunded if D and D excess if vendor reaches the
costs are less than expected. hypothetical limit of its ability to pay.
Probability $5M : 10% $2M:30% 0  75%
distribution for −$50M : 40% −$40M : 60% −$50M : 25%
cost to DOE −$150M : 50% −$140M : 10%
Probability No cost $3M : 30% $5M : 50%
distribution for −$10M : 70% −$50M : 25%
cost to vendor −$100M : 25%
Table 1: We summarized the risk-assessment interviews in the form of quantitative descriptions of the risks used
as inputs to the simulation model. The description for the D and D risk shown here is typical.
Low cost is approximately $5 million less net D and
D cost than expected. Medium cost is approximately
$50 million more net D and D cost than expected.
High cost is approximately $150 million more net D
and D cost than expected.
Risk Allocation (Representative Characteristics)
The DOE bears the risk: The DOE states up front that
it is responsible, and the vendor allocates no money
for D and D.
Shared risk: Responsibility is defined, and the ven-
dor establishes a medium-sized sinking fund and gets
money back if D and D is under budget; the DOE
covers overage.
The vendor bears the risk: The vendor pays for D
and D and must establish a large sinking fund from
the start; it gets the unused money back.
Mitigation and Prevention Strategies
The DOE bears the risk: The DOE establishes strict
standards the vendor must follow in planning and
operation and have close cooperation with environ-
mental regulators.
Shared risk: The DOE monitors the vendor some-
what in planning; the vendor is responsible for oper-
ation with checkpoints. The DOE, the vendor, and
the regulators together coordinate some of these
activities.
The vendor bears the risk: The DOE intervenes
only in extreme cases; all the vendor’s actions take
into account their impact on future D and D costs,
and the vendor works hard to establish rapport with
regulators.
Likelihood of Occurrence
The DOE bears the risk: Low cost = 10 percent,
medium cost= 40 percent, high cost= 50 percent.
Shared risk: Low cost= 30 percent, medium cost=
60 percent, high cost= 10 percent.
The vendor bears the risk: Low cost = 25 percent,
medium cost= 50 percent, high cost= 25 percent.
Costs are lowest when the risk is shared and high-
est when the DOE bears the risk, because both the
DOE and the vendor can influence outcomes and
have the incentive to do so under a shared-risk
scenario.
Modeling
We defined four main risk-allocation strategies for
further analysis (Table 2). Each strategy consisted of
specific allocations for each of the nine risks. All of
these strategies were within the realm of possibility.
Prior to engaging us to work on the problem, the DOE
was heading toward something close to the vendor-
bears strategy (Strategy 3). This strategy is quite sim-
ilar to the 1995 draft RFP, and even after we started
work, a senior DOE official declared that the DOE
would “shift all risks to the vendor.” Potential ven-
dors in turn had indicated that just about every risk
should be borne by the DOE (Strategy 1), although,
predictably, the DOE was skeptical of such a position.
As we analyzed individual risks, the analysis (and
other factors) influenced the RFP. By the time we fin-
ished analyzing the various strategies, Strategy 2 had
Strategy 1 2 3
Name DOE Shared Vendor
Risk name
Interest rate DOE Vendor Vendor
Inflation DOE DOE Vendor
Changes in law DOE DOE Vendor
Permitting DOE Shared Vendor
Waste stream C DOE Vendor Vendor
Appropriation DOE Vendor Vendor
D and D/RCRA DOE Shared Vendor
Lawsuit DOE Shared Vendor
Sabotage DOE DOE Vendor
Earthquake DOE DOE Vendor
Tornado DOE DOE Vendor
Not to exceed DOE Shared Vendor
Table 2: For each risk-allocation strategy, we defined how each risk would
be allocated. Sharing risks did not mean that each risk is shared: some
risks are shared, but other risks could still be allocated entirely to one
party or the other.
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Strategy 1 ($) 2 ($) 3 ($)
Vendor mean cost increment 157 32660 106152
Vendor standard deviation 55876 61780 94655
DOE mean cost increment 336731 107625 60400
DOE standard deviation 133409 82517 70675
Table 3: We generated key summary statistics from the risk simulations
(figures in thousands). These results described the impact of risk sharing,
but we still needed to incorporate the main cost, direct payments from the
DOE to the vendor.
support at some levels but this support was neither
complete nor final. At management’s request we also
included Strategy 4 (not shown), which differed only
slightly from Strategy 2 and under which the DOE
fared slightly worse.
We used a Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000 iter-
ations to produce profiles for each risk. For each
iteration, we summed the increments from the base
case due to each risk. The result, after accounting for
risk interactions, was a frequency distribution over
the total increments (in which higher costs in the
chart correspond to reduced profits) to the base case,
including payments for both the vendor and the DOE,
for each of the strategies considered (Table 3).
As a measure of the reliability of the simulation
results under repeated simulations, we used the stan-
dard deviation of the average cost for a given strategy,
which was approximately $2 million.
Vendor Response
We then had to predict the price the vendor would
charge under each strategy, which we could combine
with the DOE’s risk profile to obtain a net-cost distri-
bution for the DOE.
Based on extensive conversations with the privati-
zation financial task leader for the TWRS and with
external financial consultants, we developed equa-
tions to predict how the vendor would set a price in
response to any given set of risks and risk-allocation
decisions. We validated these equations using experts’
predictions regarding specific changes to the risk pro-
file for which subjective estimates were fairly easy
to provide. We then had other experts confirm that
the parameter values we used were realistic. Our
purpose was to codify judgments rather than to
describe exactly and in detail what any particular firm
would do.
One important variable used in the financial-risk
model was the probability of default, for which we
used as a proxy the probability that the vendor would
face an after-tax loss larger than its equity stake.
Specifically, we calculated the probability that h− i <
−j + k, where
h is the baseline NPV of vendor cash flows dis-
counted at the risk-free rate,
i is the net impact on vendor cash flows from
all risks, also in terms of dollars discounted at the
risk-free rate (we approximated the probability dis-
tribution on i by fitting a normal distribution to the
simulation results),
j is the amount of equity the vendor puts up, and
k is the relative tax benefit of reduced profits in
unfavorable cases compared to the baseline.
We determined cash flows by entering the pro-
posed financing terms and price into a financial
model (Weimar and Paananen 1995) based on stan-
dard accounting practice and developed by the pri-
vatization finance task manager to predict the DOE’s
and the vendor’s costs in a deterministic base case
and to clarify the literal implications of contract terms
(Figure 2).
We assumed that the vendor would raise prices
in response to being forced to take on additional
risk in the following ways: (1) Risks that are pre-
dominantly downside would decrease the expected
return; the vendor would raise the price to bring the
expected return back to its baseline value. (2) Risks
that increase the probability of default make it harder
to obtain debt financing, so we assume the interest
rate for debt financing corresponds to the degree of
risk and the percentage of equity required, both of
which we assume would increase when downside
risk increases. (3) Equity providers are concerned with
predictability on both the upside and the downside,
so they would raise the required return on equity
when the overall risk level increases.
The risk profiles and the vendor-response mod-
els determine the vendor’s required internal rate of
return (IRR); we must link this IRR to the main finan-
cial model to determine a target price for the vendor
and the corresponding distribution over cash flows.
These cash flows in turn determine debt terms (frac-
tion of debt and debt interest rate) and costs, from
which we calculate the probability of default. The
equations below implicitly define an upward slop-
ing curve with capital costs on the y-axis and prob-
ability of default on the x-axis. For given financing
terms, there is also an implicit curve for price versus
probability of default, which is downward sloping
because raising the price gives the vendor a cushion
that lowers the probability of default. We then use a
modified binary search algorithm to identify the min-
imum price at which the vendor could still finance
the project, subject to the following constraints: that
the IRR is no less than that given by Equation (1),
that the debt fraction is no greater than that given by
Equations (2) and (3), and that the debt interest rate is
no less than that given by Equation (4). The solution
lies where the curve representing price versus proba-
bility of default intersects the curve representing the
financier’s capital cost versus probability of default.
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Figure 2: This stylized influence diagram represents the financial relationships in the model. The model pre-
dicts price from risk allocation and other assumptions. The influence diagram has two features that make it
unconventional—the circular relationship involving price and probability of default and the fact that mean, vari-
ance, and probability of default are summary statistics derived from the probability distribution over the vendor
cost increment (derived from end points of the decision tree in Figure 1).
In other words, the solution lies where the project’s
pro forma NPV including debt costs is exactly 0 when
discounted at the predicted IRR requirement.
Equations Used to Represent Vendor Financial
Response to Programmatic Risks
After obtaining advice concerning a few key consid-
erations, we postulated the following relationships.
The financial experts based their estimates of param-
eter values on their knowledge of other debt offerings,
including situations in which debt ratings (which
have a known relation to default rates) and corre-
sponding terms were available.
The required after-tax internal rate of return (IRR)
is given by
IRR= k1+ k2×A+ k3×B where (1)
k1 = 003 (the risk-free rate),
k2 = 00275 (the increase in IRR required to accom-
modate $10 million of average downside), and
k3 = 0025 (the sensitivity of interest rate to variance
in NPV of cash flows).
In this equation and in the ones that follow,
A denotes the variance in the vendor cost distribu-
tion (expressed in dollars2× 109), and
B denotes the vendor mean cost increment (in
dollars ×105) from the simulation results.
If the probability of default (P ) is less than five per-
cent, the maximum debt fraction (DF) is given by
DF= k4− k5× P − 003× A/k6k10 where (2)
k4 = 095 (the maximum debt fraction for a
hypothetical case with zero percent probability of
default),
k5 = 15 (the sensitivity of the debt fraction to the
probability of default),
k6 = 323 (the variance corresponding to the mini-
mum vendor risk case, including the assumed level
of background risk), and
k10 = 30 (the exponential sensitivity of the debt
fraction to variance). We used the last part of the
equation in particular to calibrate predicted financ-
ing terms for experts’ judgments. We were aware
that it lacked a further theoretical basis, but given
our time constraints, we used it, albeit cautiously. In
later applications, we implemented this element of the
model more elegantly.
If the probability of default is greater than or equal
to five percent, the debt fraction is given by
DF = k4− k5× P − 003× A/k6k10
− k7× P − T  where (3)
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k7 = 16 (marginal sensitivity of debt fraction to
default rate for risky projects), and
T = 005 (the probability of default corresponding
to financiers’ threshold of great concern). This thresh-
old is analogous to a downgrading of the debt on the
project, which we assessed subjectively as the point
at which the project would change from business as
usual into what financiers would view as risky.
The minimum required debt interest rate (DR) is
given by
DR=M + k8× P/Y + k9×A/k6 where (4)
M = 00737 (the T -bond yield at the time of the
study),
Y = 007, considered to be near the maximum
allowable probability of default,
P = the probability of default (computed by the
model),
k8 = 0138 (the coefficient of the sensitivity of the
debt interest rate to the probability of default), and
k9 = 0015 (the sensitivity of the debt interest rate to
the variance in cash flows).
Where possible, the financial advisors identified
analogous financing packages in the market; for
example, bonds with a given rating have a histori-
cal annual default rate and a known risk premium
over T -bonds. By finding a bond rating correspond-
ing to Y = 007 and assuming a linear relationship
between yield and default rate, one can estimate k8.
We derived some parameters directly from such mar-
ket data, estimated some using subjective judgment
informed by such data, and estimated others, such
as k10, by obtaining expert judgments about what
financing terms ought to be for a small number of
specified artificial scenarios and fitting the values
to mimic those expert judgments. We compared the
implications of the model, for a wide range of cases,
Strategy 1 2 3
Vendor financial measures
Probability of default (P) 3.4% 5.17% 8.23%
Required internal rate of return (IRR) 11.6% 14.3% 30.3%
Debt fraction (%) (DF) 86.6% 82.7% 30.6%
Debt interest rate (DR) 9.3% 9.8% 11.6%
Price paid to the vendor by DOE
DOE payment to vendor ($K) $602255 $636530 $1397921
DOE financial measures
DOE mean cost increment $336731 $107625 $60400
DOE standard deviation $133409 $82517 $70675
DOE total cost $938986 $744155 $1458321
Table 4: Key financial measures of interest to the vendor were tracked for each strategy. When the vendor bears
all risks (Strategy 3), the difficulty of financing the project results in the DOE having to make much higher pay-
ments to the vendor. Although the DOE could minimize its direct payments to the vendor by accepting all risks,
this would usually lead to higher total costs.
with the intuitions and expectations of the financial
experts and of the privatization team management.
We concluded that the financing terms and the cor-
responding price for the baseline case were reason-
able. The model’s predicted impact of risk allocations
on financing terms is of the same order as the finan-
cial advisors’ estimates of those impacts for several
particular reference risks that were fairly easy to
judge. Our experts thought these parameters would
provide reasonable results over the range of strategies
we examined and, in particular, for considering the
incremental impact of changes to the risk-allocation
strategy.
Numerical Results
By optimizing our model, we obtained vendor finan-
cial terms (Table 4). By adding the DOE’s payment to
the vendor to the DOE’s simulation summary statis-
tics, we obtained the financial measures of direct
interest to the DOE (Table 4).
The distributions over vendor cost (Figure 3) and
the DOE’s net costs for the entire contract period
(Figure 4) for each strategy show some expected
characteristics, such as the low risk to the vendor
and the wider spread for the DOE when the DOE
bears the risks. The vendor’s risk distribution showed
much greater potential for loss than for gain, which
explained why, in the initial discussions of the draft
RFP, vendors indicated they would require higher
payments than the DOE had expected. Most risks
were to be assigned to one party or the other; how-
ever, the middle case (RFP) actually reduced the
DOE’s total downside risk. Some of the distributions
had spikes near $0, corresponding to cases in which
the vendor would be made whole (that is, the DOE
would reimburse the vendor for all expenses includ-
ing financing costs) after the project ended.
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Figure 3: The vendor’s distribution of cost increments (the deviation from
contracted payments in the base case) depends on the risk allocation.
Under the shared-risk strategy, the vendor has somewhat greater spread
over its potential costs, but its mean costs do not increase much.
In analyzing the strategies and the results for
each, we demonstrated that, indeed, sharing the risks
would lead to savings. Allocating all the risks to the
DOE would mean the vendor would not do enough
to keep costs low, while allocating all the risks to the
vendor would cause the vendor to demand too high
a risk premium; thus, the DOE would obtain the low-
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Figure 4: The histograms we generated for each risk-allocation strategy
show that sharing risk stochastically dominates the two extreme risk allo-
cations and so reduces both the DOE’s expected cost and its risk.
est costs with Strategy 2. By bearing all risk, the DOE
would obtain the lowest price, because the vendor
would have a lower mean cost increment and vari-
ance and thus the best financing terms. By sharing
risks, the DOE would make payments to the vendor
that would be six percent ($34 million) higher than
those under Strategy 1, but the savings to the DOE
from impacts of residual risks would lead to a net cost
savings for the DOE of over 20 percent ($194 million).
Compared to the strategy in which the vendor bears
all risks (Strategy 3), Strategy 2 requires the DOE to
pay costs due to residual risks that are 78 percent
higher ($47 million) but the total cost savings to the
DOE are nearly 50 percent ($714 million) because it
would pay a smaller risk premium to the vendor. The
price for Strategy 3 would make the project infeasible.
In spite of the cost difference, the standard deviation
of the DOE costs under Strategy 2 was only slightly
higher than under Strategy 3. Strategy 3, the costli-
est approach, was the DOE’s preferred strategy going
into this effort, but the figure given, $714 million, per-
haps overstates the potential savings accruing under
Strategy 2: if bids came in that high, the DOE could
have issued, with difficulty, a revised RFP.
Our presentation of these results triggered an ani-
mated discussion. At that time, the DOE managers
essentially switched their support from an RFP that
allocated most of the risks to the vendor to one that
shared risks. We then refined the proposed RFP by
performing a one-way sensitivity analysis for allo-
cation of each risk, using Strategy 2 as a basis. We
identified the allocation for each risk that minimized
the DOE’s cost when other risks were left unchanged.
From these allocations we constructed Strategy 5,
which resembled Strategy 2, except that the DOE and
the vendor shared the interest rate, changes-in-law,
waste-stream-C, and appropriation risks. In partic-
ular, by completely allocating to the vendors risks
that they believed were under the DOE’s control, for
example, appropriation, D and D, and permitting, the
DOE would increase its cost: vendors would assume
the worst and incorporate such risks into their price.
For comparison, we added Strategy 6, in which
all risks are shared, as well as many other varia-
tions (not shown) that we considered at the DOE’s
request. When the DOE and the vendor share all
risks, the mean cost increment to the DOE is higher
than in Strategy 2, as is the payment to the vendor,
and so Strategy 6 is $24 million worse than Strat-
egy 2. Strategy 5 had a mean cost increment to the
DOE of $5 million more than Strategy 2, in exchange
for a $15 million reduction in payments to the ven-
dor, for an additional savings of $10 million along
with a slight reduction in the standard deviation of
$2 million.
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By changing the allocation of the other risks, the
DOE would obtain relatively minor potential cost
increases or cost savings. This implied that if the ven-
dors seemed very concerned about risks for which
the model predicted little increase in costs (for exam-
ple, if the vendor demanded an additional $50 million
to accept waste-stream-C risk), then the DOE could
make concessions on those risks (for example, accept
the risk rather than pay the premium). Such risks
might have symbolic value for the vendor or the ven-
dor might have a more pessimistic view of the situa-
tion than it merited. Conversely, if the vendors were
more willing to accept a risk than the model pre-
dicted, the DOE could try to obtain concessions from
the vendor to reduce its total cost. The entire portfo-
lio of risks matters and must be considered as a unit.
For example, although the impact of shifting the NTE
risk entirely to the vendor from Strategy 2 (in which it
is shared) is $41 million, the cost of shifting the NTE
risk to the vendor when the vendor already bears all
other risks would be much larger ($198 million). In
other words, the vendors can bear a little risk comfort-
ably, but beyond a certain threshold, vendors will not
assume additional risk without penalizing the DOE
dramatically.
The final RFP was very close to our recommenda-
tion of Strategy 5. It had some refinements based in
part on further application of our model. The DOE
received several bids and selected two vendors for
the technology-development stage. Although the cost
included financing charges that the DOE perceived as
high, the bids came in lower than the DOE’s previ-
ous cost estimates and lower than bids that it had
expected prior to the reallocation of risk in the RFP.
Decision-Support System
When the DOE issued the RFP, we anticipated it
would need to evaluate bidders’ suggestions and
requests quickly during the bid-selection and negoti-
ation phases. We improved some parts of the model
to speed the DOE’s response and to take advantage
of insights gained along the way. We then created
a decision-support system (DSS) rather than a one-
off model. The resulting system answered negotia-
tors’ what-if questions in about half an hour, instead
of the half a day or more the original model could
take, depending on the complexity of the question. To
make some of the improvements, we relied on stan-
dard methods to make models faster, more flexible,
and more user-friendly. In particular, we restructured
the model to use modular components and automated
most tasks. We also made conceptual improvements
that made the model more efficient than it was in
our earlier efforts; we recommend such improvements
as a starting point for similar efforts others might
undertake.
We used neater risk templates to make it easier to
structure and assess large models. We developed four
basic templates to characterize risks that would be
common to many procurement contracts, specifically
permitting, processing, early termination, and ongo-
ing financial risks. For each stage of the contracted
project, users must complete one type of risk tem-
plate, possibly for several risks of that type. The DOE
would have to successfully resolve risks from each
stage to move on to the next stage. This fact led to
the next feature. We modeled risk interactions using
a precedence matrix, in which a cell entry of 1 or 0
indicates whether the DOE must successfully resolve
the risk in the corresponding column before going on
to encounter the risk in the corresponding row. This
matrix made it easy to add individual risks without
affecting the rest of the simulation and allowed us to
represent interactions in a more compact and compre-
hensive way.
We refined the vendor-response function and made
it more transparent based on further meetings with
the project’s external advisors. The simulation (and
templates) in the DSS specifically noted potential
default events and, separately, more severe write-
off events in which lenders would lose principal. In
the original model, financier concerns about write-
off events were reflected in the exponential penalty
function we used for situations in which the prob-
ability of default was above five percent. Consider-
ing write-off risks explicitly is more precise, and by
doing so we replaced the exponential penalty for high
default probability with linear functions of the default
and write-off probabilities. The DSS records future
write-off events and default events as parts of the
outcomes of individual risks as it simulates them.
It does not directly calculate the debt fraction but
instead derives it from a debt-service-coverage-ratio
requirement found in practice. This structure facili-
tated assessments (with which everyone was more
comfortable) of the judgmental model relating project
summary statistics to financing terms. We ended by
streamlining and automating the optimization sub-
routine for finding the vendor’s minimum price.
Organizational Impact
The insights from our analysis produced consensus
within the privatization team and within the DOE.
The DOE managers presented the conceptual sum-
mary diagram (Department of Energy Privatization
Working Group 1998, §5, Figure 4.6) on risk shar-
ing to the then secretary of energy, Hazel O’Leary.
One purpose of our effort was to provide the DOE
with evidence about the potential consequences of
insisting that the vendors alone should bear the risk,
and we successfully showed that doing this would
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have a high cost. The DOE included our results in its
report to the US Congress on the privatization project
(Department of Energy Privatization Working Group
1998, §3.4), which described the model’s impact:
The DOE also concluded that the level of uncertainty
with respect to design, financing, and regulation at
the end of Part A was such that fixing prices would
require an excessive price to compensate for the risk
faced by the vendor. Thus, a design phase (referred
to as Part B-1 in the contract) was defined to reduce
this uncertainty and to provide the DOE with vari-
ous reviews and decision points prior to proceeding
with construction and operations. The design phase
will allow time to verify technology performance on
Hanford-specific wastes and to optimize debt and
equity arrangements and technical requirements.
The flexibility that the design phase added proved
important. Our new approach to risk allocation kept
privatization viable up to that point. Our work con-
vinced the DOE to take a more businesslike attitude
toward risk. The DOE’s report to Congress (Depart-
ment of Energy Privatization Working Group 1998,
§3.2) included the following lessons learned:
Need for an equitable risk allocation. In the early stages of
developing the Phase I contracting approach, the DOE
recognized that privatization is effective in shifting sig-
nificant performance risk to the vendor, but some risks
would have to remain with the DOE. For example,
the DOE recognized that the private sector would not
accept the risk of potential fluctuations in yearly bud-
get appropriations. In addition, the DOE recognized
the need to absorb the risks associated with its own
performance in areas such as waste characterization
and preexisting conditions.
The DOE privatization working group (Department
of Energy Privatization Working Group 1998, Case
study 6) prepared a report on privatization for the
secretary of energy. Its list of lessons learned from this
project included the following:
Risk Allocation. This is the single most important fea-
ture of the “deal” to be established. There must be an
equitable allocation of risk between the DOE and the
vendor. The vendor must be held responsible for the
risks that it can control—for example, technical and
performance risks. The DOE needs to be responsible
for risks that it can control—for example, government-
furnished items and minimum waste quantities.
The overall report, which helped lead to estab-
lishment of the DOE’s Office of Privatization and
Contract Reform, contained the following recommen-
dation (Department of Energy Privatization Working
Group 1998, §2, recommendation 5):
The DOE should better integrate the perspectives of the
business community into its privatization initiatives. One
of the keys to successful privatization at the Depart-
ment is the ability to structure business deals that will
attract the business community by, for example, ensur-
ing a proper balance between risk and reward.
This represented a complete turnaround from the
view that the vendors should carry all risks, which
had led to discouraging comments in response to the
draft RFP.
Afterword
Through 1998, the DOE used the model often on an
ad hoc basis in finalizating the RFP and selecting
vendors and negotiations with the remaining vendor
(of two initially selected) going into what was called
Phase 1B-1 (the first stage was Phase 1A). In this case,
the DOE used the model to evaluate whether the ven-
dor’s proposed risk allocation was reasonable and to
negotiate an agreement (McLaughlin et al. 1998). Over
the rest of the demonstration phase up to the start
of full-scale production, the DSS forecast the opti-
mal strategy to have expected costs of $3 billion to
$5 billion less than strategies allocating almost all risk
to either the DOE or the vendor.
The larger privatization effort had a disappointing
end, however, for reasons that were beyond the scope
of the RFP risk-allocation decisions. About a year after
the last agreement, after developing much of the tech-
nology, the vendor suddenly raised its price estimates
for the next stage by more than 100 percent. The
reasons behind this move were controversial (Welch
2000). The risk of increased costs had been allocated
so that when costs became higher than the DOE con-
sidered acceptable, the vendor gave up the technol-
ogy it had developed and lost out on all incentive
payments, while the DOE paid for the work com-
pleted and incurred holding costs while seeking a
replacement. The DOE used its option to abandon
its contract with the vendor (and with it, the pri-
vatization initiative) at the end of the design phase
and then adopted a more conventional government-
owned, contractor-operated approach.
Summary
Our new approach led to the DOE’s successful
issuance of an RFP that at one time had large expected
savings in the hundreds of millions of dollars or more.
In this case, we cannot trace good decisions about
risk allocation to good ultimate outcomes, but this
approach allowed the privatization program the good
intermediate outcome of continuing; it attracted two
vendors for Phase IA, when zero response would
have been likely given the DOE’s original attitudes
toward assigning risk. In retrospect, the DOE may
have made too much of a stretch in attempting to
switch to a privatization regime under which it would
have to behave as just another business.
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That should not deter others—certainly businesses
involved in procurement and probably governmen-
tal agencies as well—from considering this approach.
Government agencies should consider the Hanford
cleanup a rather extreme case. In many simpler sit-
uations, this approach could help a bureaucracy to
overcome its reluctance to share risks. The DOE’s doc-
umented lessons learned apply in such cases. Compa-
nies doing business with government agencies may
also find our approach useful as a way to help the
agency understand the company’s positions in nego-
tiations that include the allocation of risks.
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George B. Mellinger, Senior Program Manager,
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 902 Bat-
telle Boulevard, PO Box 999, Richland, Washington
99352, writes: “I was The Deputy Manager of the
Waste Disposal Integration Team (WIT) at the Han-
ford, Washington Department of Energy (DOE) site
from 1995–1998. The WIT was the Pacific North-
west National Laboratory team (also referred to as
the Privatization Team) responsible for assisting the
DOE with developing, implementing, and managing
the contracting strategy for the cleanup of massive
amounts of nuclear waste stored in underground stor-
age tanks. Under the risk and decision management
sub-task for the WIT, extensive work was done in risk
allocation modeling to support this multi-billion dol-
lar DOE Tank Waste Retrieval System (TWRS) Priva-
tization effort.
“I verify that the authors of paper 54-702-JK (Keisler,
Buehring, McLaughlin, Robershotte, and Whitfield)
did in fact do the work described for the TWRS Priva-
tization team in the roles they detailed, and that their
efforts did have the impact they describe. The concept
of proper and appropriate risk allocation was key in
garnering private industry support for this huge and
complex cleanup effort. Specifically, the Request for
Proposal (RFP) was modified based in part on their
recommendations. The DOE received bids in response
to the modified RFP, which enabled the initiative to
proceed at that time.”
